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Mr, Geoffrey Butler
332 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
April 21st, 1987
IN RE: Trees v. Lewis, case no. 19333
Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 27 (j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I
submit the following citation of supplemental authorities in
reference to the alleged signature requirement of my client
Mr. Trees.
At oral argument on the 10th day of February, 1987,
Appellant's counsel, Mr. Bell, implied that Trees had not in
fact signed Exhibit P15, which both parties stipulated was
part of the "option" referred to throughout the trial.
This point was argued in my brief at pages 26-27, but may
also be further moot pursuant to the case of Baldwin v.
Vantage Corporation, 676 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1984). Indeed,
perhaps the Appellant Lewis was the only party, who in fact
needed to have signed P15 in the first instance. See
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986).
Yours Very Truly,

^yn^ji^^^

-*£-^-

Michael D. Hughes

APR221987
MDH/sm
cc
encl.

Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on the 21st day of April,
198 7, I did mail a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing letter to Mr. J. Richard Bell, Appellant's
counsel, 303 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115,
postage prepaid.
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DURHAM, JJ, concur.
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., dissented.

Carl BALDWIN and Larry Gleim,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

1. Evidence <3=>265(8)
Admission of a fact in pleading is a
judicial admission and is. normally conclusive on party making it

v.
VANTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 18202.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 18, 1984.
Purchasers brought action against ven-

»ttsz^z££
S e
pJ

"under " e contract. The Fourth Dise d udgment
Vend Bull
S c t Court, rUtah
County, fJ.r Robert
ntchasers appealed. The Supreme Court,
^
J held that (1) trial court properly
S s d discretion in relieving vendor o
udidal admission, made in pleading, that
l i t of vendor had guaranteed availabu £ of construction financing to purchasers
T e e conduct of both parties throughout
Remainder of proceedings showed that

2 ? t e^

J

°

°p «

2. Evidence <3=>265(8)
Trial court may relieve party from consequences of a judicial admission.
3. Evidence <fc=>265(8)
In action for rescission of contract for
sale of land and restitution of amounts paid
under the contract, trial court properly relieved defendant vendor from consequences
of admission, made in pleading, that its
agent guaranteed availability of construction financing to purchasers, since conduct
of both parties to remainder of proceeding
showed that question of guarantee was a
material issue for judge to determine, purchasers did not rely on admission nor were
they misled by it, resolution of that issue
would weigh heavily in determining outcome of case, and defendants denied existence of guarantee in another part of answer and in deposition.
4. Principal and Agent e=>190(2)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in rejecting purchasers' testimony that vendor's agent extended them guarantee of
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couotru'Lu.n ..nancing, even though agent
was able to testify only that he could not
mber making such guarantee, where
......or presented testimony that agent did
not have authority to make such guarantee
and that such guarantees were rarely
made, and no evidence was presented that
details of alleged guaranteed loan were
discussed.
5. Evidence «»588
Testimony of witnesses is to be gi veil
such weight and credibility as trier of fact
may find reasonable under circumstances.
6. Fraud e»58(l)
In regard to purchasers3' claim for misrepresentation based on alleged guarantee
of construction financing by agent of vendor, trial court properly held purchasers to
preponderance of evidence standard, no: to
clear and convincing evidence standard, in
their attempt to prove misrepresents ^<"~

Edward M. Garrett and Joseph E. Hatch,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent
;

HO'WE, Justice:
"
•' '
Plaintiffs Carl Baldwin and .Larry Gleim,
partners in the construction business, bring
this appeal from an adverse judgment in a
suit which they brought for the rescission
of a contract and the restitution of all
amounts they had paid under it. Defendant Vantage Corporation is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Deseret Federal Savings and
Loan Association. Vantage was engaged
in the development of Blackhawk Estates
in Pleasant Grove, Utah. Doug Boulton
was the project manager of Vantage and
also a vice-president of Deseret Federal

In the spring of 1978, plaintiffs met with
Boulton and negotiated a contract to purchase seven lots in Plat C of the Blackhawk
r r
^ *tes from Vantage. No written conwas ever presented at trial; however,
7. Frauds, Statute of <e>129(5)
•x* the terms of the sale were undisPart performance of oral contract :
Plaintiffs paid $8,950 as a 10%
sale of seven lots was sufficient to remt ; r down payment on lot numbers 18, 19 and
contract from statute of frauds, wh^rc 2S (at $13,500 per lot) and on lot numbers
both parties admitted existence of contract J4f 35, 49 and 58 (at $12,500 per lot). The
where there was no dispute over material interest rate was 11% per annum, for the
terms except alleged guarantee of con- first year after electrical power was made
struction financing, and where purchasers available to the lots and 13%' per annum
had made down payment, two interest pay- thereafter. No duration of the contract
ments, and fully paid for and received con- was set; however, it can be assumed that it
veyances from defendant to three of seven
, as short-term given its high interest rate
lots U.C.A.1953, 25-5-1.
and considering Vantage's objectives for
8. Implied and Constructive Contracts • 'iering into the sale. In addition, Van..ie agreed to subordinate its interest in
<5=»8
"he
lots so that plaintiffs could secure conVendor would not be unjustly enhcr.u-;
by foreclosure sale on lots, notwithstand- struction financing, provided that such fiing fact that purchasers had paid ten pur- ; -incing came from Deseret Federal
cent of principal and interest for two ye-rs ?: ere was likewise no dispute that plainon contract balance, since any amount d* • t.;"fs made interest payments of $4,278.59
rived from sale of lots and foreclosure s:\.v -nd $2,990.32 and sold three of the seven
over and above amount owing vendor was undeveloped lots to third parties in 1979.
In the spring of 1980, plaintiffs sought a
directed to be paid to purchasers, and p chasers were given six months to redeem .. instruction loan from Deseret Federal to
lots from foreclosure sale.
• - '•build "spec homes" on. two of the remaining four lots. Deseret Federal denied the
request for a loan pursuant to its policy,
Ray M. Harding, Jr., Pleasant Grove, fcr tnen in force, to lend no money for building
plaintiffs and appellants.
speculation; that is, building homes to put
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on the market as opposed to building
homes for particular buyers. When they
could not obtain construction funds elsewhere, plaintiffs sought to rescind the contract to purchase the lots and to recover
the amounts they had paid in principal and
interest Defendants counterclaimed to
foreclose plaintiffs' interest in the four
lots.
At trial, both plaintiffs testified that during the 1978 negotiations Boulton "guaranteed" that construction financing would be
available from Deseret Federal when they
were ready to build. Boulton, who admitted that only he and the plaintiffs were
present, could not remember making any
guarantee. He stated further that he neither had authority to bind Deseret Federal
to grant a loan in the future nor to process
real property loans. In addition, there was
evidence that guaranteeing the availability
of future loans was not a normal practice
of officers of either Vantage or Deseret
Federal
The trial court found that plaintiffs
failed to prove that defendant's agent Boulton made a guarantee as to the availability
of construction financing. It then concluded that the statute of frauds, U.C.A., 1953,
§ 25-5-1, could not be used by the plaintiffs as a basis for rescission because there
was either sufficient memoranda or part
performance to take the contract out of the
statute. Rescission was denied plaintiffs
and foreclosure was granted to the defendant.
[1-3] Plaintiffs first contend that the
trial court erred in finding that no guarantee existed because defendant had admitted
the guarantee in its answer to the plaintiffs' complaint. Therefore, plaintiffs argue, the existence of the guarantee should
stand as a stipulated fact An admission of
fact in a pleading is a judicial admission
and is normally conclusive on the party
making it Yates v. Large, 284 Or. 217,
585 P.2d 697 (1978). See also Paul
Schoonover, Inc. v. Ram Construction,
Inc., 129 Ariz. 204, 630 P.2d 27 (1981).
However, this rule is not absolute. The
trial court may relieve a party from the

consequences of a judicial admission. See
9 Wigmore on Evidence (1981), § 2590.
See also McCormick on Evidence, 2nd Ed.
1972, § 265. In the instant case, the defendant admitted the guarantee in answering the plaintiffs' first cause of action.
However, in answering the plaintiffs'
fourth cause of action, which was based on
fraud, the defendant denied that it had
represented that it would guarantee financing. Thus the defendant's answer was contradictory. Further, subsequent to the filing of the defendant's answer, the plaintiffs propounded interrogatories to the defendant, one of which inquired whether the
defendant ever stated that it would guarantee construction loans on the lots. Defendant answered this interrogatory with an
unequivocal "No." At the pretrial hearing,
counsel for the defendant stated that his
client had made no promise to make construction loans. Counsel for the plaintiffs
made no response to that statement, but
indicated that "it will be a factual issue."
At the trial, both parties presented testimony regarding the guarantee as though it
had not been admitted in the pleadings. It
was clear that the resolution of this issue
would weigh heavily in determining the
outcome of the case. Defendant tried to
establish that Boulton did not make the
guarantee and that such procedure was
uncommon among its personnel. Plaintiffs, with equal vigor, adduced testimony
both to establish the guarantee's existence
and to show its importance in their determination to make the purchase. It was not
until counsel for the plaintiffs was making
his final argument to the judge after the
close of the evidence that he pointed out
the admission in the defendant's answer.
Under these facts it is clear that while
defendant may have negligently admitted
its existence in answering the complaint,
the conduct of both parties throughout the
remainder of the proceeding showed that
this question was a material issue for the
judge to determine. Plaintiffs did not rely
on the admission nor were they misled by
it. There is authority that an admission
may be waived where the parties treat the
admitted fact as an issue. In Re Withing-
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ton's Estate, 99 Cal.App. 617, 279 P. 196
(1929); 71 OJ.S. § 161, pg. 335. Therefore, we decline to interfere with the trial
court's discretion in not holding defendant
to its admission in its answer.
Plaintiffs further contend that the trial
court abused its discretion by arbitrarily
finding that no guarantee had been made;
that the uncontradicted testimony of the
plaintiffs established its making, and Boulton did not testify that he did not make a
guarantee but only that he "could not remember" making a guarantee. Plaintiffs
rely upon McClellan v. David, 84 Nev. 283,
439 P.2d 673 (1968), where the Nevada
Supreme Court found an abuse of discretion by the trial court in setting aside a
default judgment. There, a secretary in
the office of the plaintiffs attorney testified with exactness that she had conversed
three times with the defendant by telephone soon after he had been served with
summons about the necessity of his filing
an answer to the complaint. Her recollection of the conversations was refreshed
from written notes made by her at the
time. The defendant did not deny the conversations, but simply testified that he did
not recall them. The trial court relieved
the defendant of his default, but that ruling was reversed on appeal. After the
court held that there was no fundamental
conflict in the testimony requiring it to
adhere to the trial court's finding in favor
of the defendant, the court said:
Testimony of a witness that he does not
remember whether a certain event took
place does not contradict positive testimony that such event or conversation
took place. Bender v. Roundup Mining
Co., 138 Mont. 306, 356 P.2d 469, 471
(1960); Tennent v. Leary, 81 Ariz. 243,
304 P.2d 384, 387 (1956). See also: Comment Note—Comparative value of positive and negative testimony. 98 A.L.R.
161. Therefore, we hold that there was
no credible evidence before the lower
court to show that the neglect of [the
defendant] was excusable under the circumstances.

We have no quarrel with the rule nor
with its application to the facts of that
case. However, in Bender v. Roundup
Mining Co., supra, one of the cases cited
by the Nevada court in support of the rule,
the court there recognized that even
though a witness's testimony is not directly
controverted by other verbal testimony, the
credibility of the witness and the weight to
be given his testimony are questions to be
determined by the trial court. In the
McClellan case, there was no doubt cast
upon the credibility of the secretary's testimony since she had made written notes of
her conversations with the defendant
(which conversations the defendant could
not remember). In the Bender case, however, the court upheld the trial court, which
chose to disbelieve the testimony of an
injured miner and his wife that the miner
had reported an accident to an employee in
the mining company's office. The employee testified that he had no recollection of
any such report being made to him by the
miner and that if he had made such a
report he would have referred him to his
foreman and that he had no recollection of
doing that. Other factors which cast doubt
upon the credibility of the miner's testimony were that he did not complain to his
foreman or anyone else in the mine on the
night the alleged accident happened; although he was absent from work for a
brief period, neither the foreman's absentee report nor the miner's physician's report indicated that he had reported the
suffering of any accidental injury. In view
of these and other factors which reflected
doubt on the plaintiffs testimony, the Montana court held that the Industrial Accident
Board and the trial court were not
compelled to believe the plaintiffs testimony that he had sustained an accident and
had reported it to his employer as he
claimed.
[4,5] We likewise find in the instant
case that the trial court was not compelled
to believe the plaintiffs' testimony that
Boulton extended to them a guarantee of
construction financing even though Boulton was only able to testify that he could
not remember making such a guarantee.
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Defendant presented testimony that Boul- and in other remarks from the bench, the
ton had no authority to make a guarantee trial court stated that clear and convincing
of a loan, and guarantees were rarely made proof was required to prove fraud and that
by officials of Deseret Federal or Vantage. the plaintiffs had failed to sustain that
Details of the loan, such as the maximum burden. Thus the record indicates that the
or minimum amounts, qualifications, inter- trial court distinguished between the two
est rates, payback schedules or even the standards of proof and held the plaintiffs
length of this loan, were not discussed. only to the preponderance standard in their
Under these circumstances the trial court attempt to prove misrepresentation.
may well have doubted the credibility of
Since no guarantee of construction fithe plaintiffs' testimony. We believe that
nancing
was found, the plaintiffs' performthis case is controlled by the general rule
that the testimony of witnesses is to be ance on the contract was not conditional.
given such weight and credibility as the Therefore, their failure to make payments
trier of fact may find reasonable under the as required by the contract constituted a
circumstances. Guinand v. Walton, 25 breach. Plaintiffs contend, however, that
Utah 2d, 253, 480 P.2d 137 (1971). Con- because the contract was oral it came withsidering all the evidence in a light most in the statute of frauds, U.C.A., 1953,
favorable to the successful party and in- § 25-5-1, and was unenforceable. Being
dulging in all reasonable inferences to be unenforceable, the plaintiffs argue, they
drawn therefrom in support of the judg- are entitled to rescind the contract and
ment, we find no arbitrariness on the part recover their payments made thereunder.
of the trial court in rejecting the plaintiffs'
"yX [7] We need not here decide whether a
testimony.
buyer of real estate may use the statute of
[6] Plaintiffs further assert that one of
frauds to effect a rescission and recover
their claims against the defendant was
his payments. Plaintiffs concede that
based on misrepresentation which they had
would be an uncommon use of the statute
the burden of proving only by a prepondersince generally the statute is relied upon by
ance of the evidence. They complain that
a vendor to bar a purchaser from enforcing
the trial court held them instead to proving
an
oral contract. Assuming for the purall of the elements of a cause of action for
poses
of this case that a buyer has such a
fraud by clear and convincing evidence.
remedy,
it clearly was not available to the
Assuming for the purposes of this case
plaintiffs
in this case since there had been
that the plaintiffs are correct in their aspart
performance
of the contract, thereby
sumption that proof of misrepresentation
removing
it
frojn
fhp g tat , l f n n f •fV"mrln,
and proof of fraud require different standards of proof, we find no error. The trial § 25-5-8.MBoth parties admitted the existcourt in its findings of fact found that ence oi tne contract and had no dispute
"plaintiffs did not sustain the burden of over its material terms except for the guarproof that any . . . guarantee was made to antee. The plaintiffs had made a down
them." The court did not there specify payment and two interest payments and
what degree of proof it was imposing on had fully paid for and received conveyances
the plaintiffs. However, the court re- from the defendant to three of the seven
marked from the bench at the conclusion of lots. This part performance was sufficient
the trial that "it cannot find by a prepon- to remove the contract from the statute of
derance of the evidence the agreement to frauds under these circumstances where
provide construction financing." We inter- theexistence of the contract was admitted.
pret this finding of fact and statement MartxnvTScholU Utah, Case JSIo. 17542;
from the bench to mean that the court did filed November 14,1983. We find no merit
not believe that any such representation in plaintiffs' assertion that there were realwas ever made by the defendant. Further- ly seven separate contracts for the purmore, both in a subsequent finding of fact chase of the lots and any part performance
Utah Rep. 675-681 P.2d—7
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related only to the contracts on the three
lots the plaintiffs paid for and for which
they received conveyances. The trial court
found against this contention, and we sustain that finding. See Sears v. Riemersma, Utah, 655 P.2d 1105 (1982).
[8] Plaintiffs lastly complain that they
had paid ten percent of the principal and
two years' interest on the contract balance,
and they will lose those amounts in the
foreclosure by the defendant They charge
the defendant will thereby be unjustly enriched at their expense. We disagree. By
foreclosure, the defendant cannot receive
more than what the plaintiffs promised to
pay in the contract, an amount not disputed
by the plaintiffs. Any amount derived
from the sale of the lots at foreclosure sale
over and above the amount owing to the
defendant was directed to be paid to the

plaintiffs. In addition, plaintiffs were given six months to redeem the lots from the
foreclosure sale. Under these circumstances there is no element of unjust enrichment
present
The judgment is affirmed.
awarded to defendant

Costs are

HALL, C.J., and OAKS and DURHAM,
JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., dissents.

(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >
>*. 2 j T ^ V V * * ' 1 ^ AT
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looks at the totality of the circumstances
and holds that the affidavit should be
viewed in its entirety and in a common
sense fashion. Under the Anderson standard, the affidavit was sufficient The officer had recently received information
from two confidential informants who were
in a position to have information about
: EXPERT WITNESS
drug trafficking in the community. One of
[2] Defendants claims that the trial the informants had previously given the
court erred in allowing Officer Olsen to officer reliable information. The officer's
give his opinion on whether defendants pos- investigation had also revealed that defendsessed the drug paraphernalia and the four ants had returned from a drug run to Coloand one-half ounces of marijuana with the rado and were receiving an abnormal numintent to distribute the marijuana for value. ber of guests into their residence who were
The record reflects, however, that the court staying but a few minutes. ; Finally, one of
did not permit the officer to give his opin- the confidential informants purchased apion regarding defendants' purpose in pos- proximately one-quarter of an ounce of sussessing the marijuana. Qualification of a pected marijuana from defendants on the
person as an expert witness under the Utah day the warrant was issued. Viewed in its
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, is in the dis- entirety and in a common sense fashion,
cretion of the trial court State v. Locke, the affidavit set out sufficient facts to sup688 P.2d 464 (Utah 1984); see State v. port the reliability and credibility of the
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982) (decided informants relied upon by the officer as
well as the conclusions of the officer.
under the now superseded Utah Rules of
Defendants' convictions are affirmed.
Evidence, Rule 56). We find no abuse of
discretion in the court's allowing the officer
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and ZIMto testify as an expert. Officer Olsen had
MERMAN,
JJ., concur.
been involved in the drug culture as a user
and a seller for four or five years prior to
STEWART, J., concurs in the result
becoming a police officer. He had worked
for several years as an investigator and
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
, a ^^v^^vy £
demonstrated to the court his knowledge of
the current drug culture before the court
qualified him as an expert
phernalia), together with the two twenties
and a ten in Darla Espinoza's apron, the
previous sale to the confidential informant,
and Darla Espinoza's statements when the
police searched the house all support defendants' convictions. ,

Samuel M. WILLIAMS and Shelley
SEARCH WARRANT
Thomas Williams, Plaintiffs and
[3] Defendants attack the search warAppellants,
rant on the ground that it was issued in
v.
violation of the Aguilar-Spinelli twopronged standard. See Spinelli v. United Clarie SINGLETON; C.A., Inc., a Utah
States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct 584, 21
corporation, dba, C.A. Limited; Americap Realty, Inc., a Utah corporation;
L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378
and Robert L. Monson, Defendants and
U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723
Respondents.
(1964). We abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test in State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099
No. 20041.
(Utah 1985), and followed the United States
Supreme Court of Utah.
Supreme Court's more recent decisions in
Aug. 5, 1986.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct
2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727,104 S.Ct 2085,
Co-owners of property held in joint ten80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984). The new standard ancy brought action against persons who
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offered to buy property who later decided
not to purchase property. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Kenneth
Rigtrup, J., found no binding agreement
had been reached between parties under
earnest money receipt and offer to purchase and thus offerors were entitled to
return of their earnest money deposit
Owners appealed. The Supreme Court,
held that (1) joint tenant did not have
authority to accept on cotenantfs behalf or
as her agent without written authority first
obtained; (2) offer to purchase when accepted created interest in real estate within
statute of frauds; and (3) offer to purchase
failed to ripen into contract to when cotenant did not ratify in writing joint tenant's
acceptance within one-day period contemplated by offeror, thus entitling offerors to
return of earnest money deposit
Affirmed. ...
1. Husband and Wife <3=»14.10
Husband could not bind his wife, who
was joint tenant of property, by contract he
made with agent regarding common property; thus agent could not accept on wife's
behalf or as her agent without written authority first obtained.
2. Frauds, Statute of <3=>74(1)
An offer to purchase when accepted
creates an interest in real estate and is
within statute of frauds. U.C.A.1953, 255-3.
3. Frauds, Statute of <s=>115(4)
Language requiring that every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or
broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation had to be subscribed by party to be charged therewith did not apply to
real estate transactions between parties, as
it dealt instead with claims for commissions
by agents or brokers. U.C.A.1953, 25-5-1,
25-5-3, 2&-5-4(5).
4. Joint Tenancy <s»13
Offer to purchase property owned in
joint tenancy never ripened into contract
where joint tenant failed to ratify in writing cotenant's acceptance of offer within

one-day period contemplated by offer;
thus, offerors were entitled to return of
earnest money deposit .«

Cary D. Jones, John T. Anderson, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Ronald L. Poulton, David R. Blaisdell,
Salt Lake City, for C.A. Limited and Singleton, - ^ v '"'••>; ' ••'i:"1 ": " - '• ~':- ''•'"•-Gregory B. Wall,' Salt Lake City, for
Monson and Americap Realty, Inc.

PER CURIAM:

.: \^,.';-, ~Z', ^-T-'v

Plaintiffs appeal from a "summary judgment in favor of defendants. The trial
court found that no binding agreement had
been reached between the parties under an
earnest money receipt and offer to purchase (the contract) and that defendants
were entitled to the return of their earnest
money deposit We affirm.
On appeal from a summary judgment,
we review the evidence in a light most
favorable to the losing party. Geneva
Pipe Co. v. S &H Insurance Co., 714 P.2d
648 (Utah 1986). Summary judgment is
proper if the movant is entitled to it as a
matter of law on the undisputed facts.
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Bushnell Real Estate,
Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983).
The controlling facts are as follows:
On August 16, 1983, defendants offered
to purchase from plaintiffs property owned
by plaintiffs in joint tenancy. The offer
was accompanied by a $5,000 earnest money deposit and required plaintiffs to accept
within one day. Jodie Bennion, the real
estate agent for plaintiffs, contacted them
in California on August 17 and informed
them of the terms and conditions of the
offer. In response, Bennion received a
telegram worded as follows:
I, Sam Williams, hereby authorize Jodie
Bennion of Gump & Ayers Real Estate to
accept an offer to sell my home located
at 1040 East 1st Avenue Salt Lake City
$205,000 all of the terms acceptable.
(Signed) Samuel M. Williams.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

WILLIAMS v,. SINGLETON

Utah

423

Cite as 723 P^d 421 (Utah 1986)

Bennion then accepted the offer by signing
"Sam Williams by Jodie Bennion agent tele
gram attached." Defendants decided not
to purchase the property, and plaintiffs demanded that defendants' earnest money deposit be forfeited to plaintiffs. Defendants
refused, and this suit followed. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment
by defendants, plaintiff Shelley Williams
stated by affidavit that she had instructed
her husband to accept the offer on her
behalf and that Bennion had likewise been
informed of her willingness to sell. The
trial court ruled that Bennion had accepted
the offer on behalf of Sam Williams only
and that without Shelley Williams' signature on the contract the accepted offer was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
The court also held that Bennion had no
authority to accept the offer on plaintiffs'
behalf as plaintiffs did not give her a written power of attorney to so act. Plaintiffs
assign both those rulings as errors. Inasmuch as we hold that Shelley Williams'
failure to sign, either personally or through
her agent, rendered the contract unenforceable, we do not reach the merits of the
second issue.
Section 25-5-1 of our statute of frauds
controls the creation of estates or interests
in real property:
No estate or interest in real property,
other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over
or concerning real property or in any
manner relating thereto, shall be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized by writing.
(Emphasis added.) Similar requirements
govern contracts for leases and sales of
lands. Section 25-5-3 provides:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale,
of any lands, or any interest in lands,
shall be void unless the contract, or some
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom

the lease or sale is to be made, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized in
writing.
(Emphasis added.)
[1] A contract made by telegraph is
deemed written under section 25-5-7, and
an agent may sign for his or her principal,
section 25-5-9, so long as the authority is
given in writing. Bradshaw v. McBride,
649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982). Bennion received
her written authority from Sam Williams
by telegram and accepted the offer as his
agent with the telegram attached. Consequently, Sam Williams properly accepted
the offer of defendants within the time
required by defendants. However, Sam
Williams was a joint tenant with Shelley
Williams and could not have accepted on
her behalf or as her agent without written
authority first obtained. There is no husband-wife exception to the statute of
frauds. Holmgren Bros., Inc. v. Ballard,
534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975); Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970).
One joint tenant or tenant in common cannot bind his cotenant by a contract which
he may make relating to the common property. Carbine v. Meyer, 126 Cal.App.2d
386, 272 P.2d 849 (1954).
Plaintiffs advance several arguments in
urging us to recognize Sam Williams' acceptance on behalf of both plaintiffs as
enforceable against defendants. They
claim that Shelley Williams expressly authorized her husband and later expressly
ratified that authorization to sell by approving and consenting to the filing of
their complaint against defendants. They
also claim that only the signature of the
party to be charged is required on a contract and that the parties to be charged in
this case were defendants. They conclude
that in any event the offer here does not
purport to create, grant, assign, or surrender an interest in real property and is
therefore not a "conveyance" embraced by
the statute of frauds.
[2] Contrary to plaintiffs' argument, an
offer to purchase when accepted creates an
interest in real estate and is within the
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receipted shall cancel this offer without
• damages to the undersigned agent
Shelley did not join or ratify in writing
her husband's acceptance within the oneday period. Where an offer has expired by
[3] Plaintiffs' reliance on statutory lan- lapse of time, an attempt to accept is inefguage that "the party to be charged" in fectual to create a contract Morrison v.
this case should be defendants is mis- Rayen Investment, Inc., 97 Nev. 58, 624
placed. That language does not appear in P.2d 11 (1981). As a corollary, an attempt
the sections pertinent to their situation. to ratify after the offer has expired by
Section 25-5-3 specifically requires that lapse of time is equally ineffectual to rethe contract be "in writing subscribed by vive the contract The open-ended ratthe party by whom the sale is to be made." ification urged by plaintiffs would play
Certainly this section governing land con- havoc with the laws of offer and accepttracts, as well as section 25-5-1 governing ance and allow joint tenants to effectively
conveyances by deed, mandates expressly withhold their joint contractual committhat a document to be enforceable under ment while bargaining individually until
the statute ofjfcajids must be subscribed the most attractive offer was made, all the
by the part^^rantin^the conveyance, he- while holding several offerors to their comVine v. Whitehoust/zi Utah 260, 109 P. 2 mitments. In Burg v. Betty Gay of Wash(1910). The provision in section 25-5-4(5) ington, Inc., 423 Pa. 485, 225 A.2d 85
that "[e]very agreement authorizing or em- (1966), a similar claim of ratification was
ploying an agent or broker to purchase or rejected by the Supreme Court of Pennsylsell real estate for compensation" must be vania. The lessor there claimed to have
subscribed by the party to be charged ratified the signing of a lease by his agent
therewith is inapplicable. It was designed by instituting suit on the lease agreement
to protect owners' of land from fraudulent The tenant under the purported lease had
and fictitious claims for commissions, disavowed any obligation under the lease
Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976), and had never taken possession or paid
and has no bearing on real estate transac- rent to the lessor. Said the court in affirmtions between parties.
ing the judgment against the lessor.
If ratification is relied upon in order to
Finally, plaintiffs may not use their joint
establish the authority of the agent, it
complaint against defendants as a written
must
be in writing and executed prior to
ratification by Shelley of Sam's acceptance.
any
effective
renunciation by the lessee
An offeror may restrict the manner of acof
the
lease
agreement
Otherwise, the
ceptance, provided his or her intention to
defense
of
statute
of
frauds
will be availdo so is clearly expressed. Cochran v.
able
only
to
the
lessor,
which
result
Connell, 53 Or.App. 933, 632 P.2d 1385
would
be
totally
inconsistent
with
the
(1981), citing 1 Corbin on Contracts § 88,
requirement of mutuality of obligation of
373-74 (1963). At the time the offeror
contracts and with the settled policy that
makes the offer, he or she has full control
either party may raise the defense of the
of its terms and may specify the time withstatute of frauds.
in which acceptance is limited. McKibben
v. Mohawk Oil Co., Ltd., 667 P.2d 1223 Id. 225 A.2d at 86 (citation omitted).
(Alaska 1983). Defendants' offer read in
[4] A similar result is dictated here.
pertinent part:
Under the concept of mutuality of obliThis payment is received and offer is gation, defendants could not have prevailed
made subject to the written acceptance in enforcing a sale by plaintiffs, had Shelof the seller endorsed hereon within one ley's failure to join in the acceptance within
days from the date hereof and unless so one day been the result of her refusal to
approved, the return of the money herein sell. Coombs v. Ouzounian, supra;
statute of frauds. U.CJL, 1953, § 25-5-3,
supra; Coombs v. Ouzounian, supra;
Knight v. Chamberlain, 6 Utah 2d 394,
315 P.2d 273 (1957).
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Vandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 487
.2d 697 (1971); Lee v. Polyhrones, 57
ftah 401, 195 P. 201 (1921). Defendants
ffered to purchase the joint interest of
laintiffs, and Sam negotiated for the sale
I the joint interest. When Shelley did not
itify in writing Sam's acceptance within
le one-day period contemplated by the of»r, the offer never ripened into a contract,
id defendants were entitled to have the
irnest money deposit returned to them.
ee Walk v. Miller, 650 P.2d 1286 (Colo.
pp.1981).
Affirmed.
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RANSAMERICA CASH RESERVE,
INC., a Maryland Corporation, and
First National Bank of Boston, Plaintiffs,
v.
arrell G. HAFEN; Transworld Securities, S.A., a Corporation, Does 1
through 100 inclusive; and Dixie Power
and Water, Inc., Defendants.
No. 20450.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 5, 1986.
Summary judgment was awarded in
vor of plaintiffs in the Fifth District
>urt, Washington County, J. Harlan
urns, J., and defendants appealed. The
ipreme Court held that: (1) one defendt's objections to unsigned findings and
elusions of law in support of summary
•<mt were abortive, and thus, subseier striking unsigned findings was
to dispose of defendant's motion
nmary judgment, and (2) one
^tion to amend summary
be resolved before any

appeal could be taken from summary judgment
Appeals dismissed; case remanded.
1. Appeal and Error <£=>428(2)
Notice of appeal filed before disposition of proper postjudgment motion is ineffective to confer jurisdiction upon Supreme
Court Rules App.Proc, Rule 4(b). - ..
2. Appeal and Error <s=>344
Finality of judgment is suspended
upon timely filing of postjudgment motion,
and time for appeal does not commence
until final disposition of such motion.
Rules App.Proc, Rule 4(b).
3. Judgment <3=*189, 325
Defendant's objections to unsigned
findings and conclusions of law in support
of summary judgment were abortive, and
thus, subsequent order striking unsigned
findings was ineffective to dispose of defendant's motion to amend summary judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a); Rules
App.Proc, Rule 4(a, b).
4. Appeal and Error <3=>346(2)
Defendant's motion to amend summary judgment had to be resolved before any
appeal could be taken from summary judgment Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a); Rules
App.Proc, Rule 4(a, b).
5. Appeal and Error <3=>78(1), 345(1)
Untimely motion for "reconsideration"
had no effect upon either finality of summary judgment or running of time for any
appeal. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a); Rules
App.Proc, Rule 4(a, b).
Scott A. Gubler, St. George, for plaintiffs.
John L. Miles, MacArthur Wright, St
George, Darrell G. Hafen, Upland, Cal., for
defendants.
PER CURIAM:
Defendants separately appeal a summary
judgment award of $93,400 against them
and in favor of plaintiffs. In the absence

\
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

